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on the investment treaty negotiation front has gone hand in hand with the development of strong negotiating BIT models that have deeply marked today's international investment law, at least until the advent of the first new generation investment agreements on the other side of the Atlantic with the US and Canadian Model BITs of 2004. 2 In 2009, when the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon signalled the transfer of competence over the conclusion of agreements covering foreign direct investment from the member states to the Union, 3 some member states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, proved reluctant to let go of their tried-and-tested investment treaty models. 4 This insistence on the part of member states on the provisions of their own BIT templates found expression in the terms 'best practices' 5 and the 'gold standard'. 6 However, already in 2010, the European Commission explained that, although 'the principles and parameters [for the negotiations] will be inspired by "best practices" that Member States have developed', the Commission itself will establish the 'broad contours of the scope and standards the Union should be setting through international investment negotiations'. 7 In fact, relevant EU documents, including negotiating mandates, 8 statements of principles 9 and, notably, the preliminary treaty versions of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 10 indicate that EU member state model BITs have only a marginal role to play in EU negotiations. The latter appear to follow the trajectory of new generation investment agreements 11 and thus mark a break with member states' 'best practices'. More significantly, the international investment law policy elaborated by the EU encourages new formulations of old standards, substantive as well as procedural, responding in part to accusations articulated against the international system of investment protection and, ultimately, taking new generation investment agreements a step further. We are witnessing the decline of the old EU member state 'good practices' and the dawning of a new era, that of the EU's 'better practices'. The purpose of the present article is to explore this policy shift in Europe and the move towards this new generation of investment agreements. In order to do this, it will begin by considering developments within the EU with a bearing on the elaboration of its international investment policy, before examining the 'best practices' of the member states. In an ensuing step, the article will turn to the new EU policy. It will start by considering the absence of a concrete negotiating EU model BIT in order to better understand the formulation of the Union's negotiating objectives. Following this inquiry, it will query the new standard of the EU, looking in turn at its substantive and procedural aspects. A final section will conclude.
Developments within the EU at the Heart of the Policy Shift
A little background history may be useful to highlight the confluence of reasons that have led to the formulation of a new investment policy in the EU. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 marked an important milestone in the elaboration of international investment treaty norms within (and without) the Union. By virtue of Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), foreign direct investment has come under exclusive EU competence as part of the Union's common commercial policy. 12 Pursuant to Article 2(1) of the TFEU, in the area of its exclusive competence, 'only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the member states being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts'. 13 This transfer of competence was born out of a wish to offer a robust basis for the Union's external economic action and in order to enhance its role in the elaboration of international investment norms.
the new treaties will be concluded as mixed agreements. 15 Although it is beyond the purview of the present contribution to discuss the transfer of competence, it is worth noting that at least at some stage the European Commission perceived the latter as being comprehensive and exclusive, 16 an opinion that jarred with the one advocated by some member states. 17 It is possible that, despite any theoretical underpinnings to the contrary, the new competence could de facto prove to be exclusive and encompassing of all types and aspects of investment, with a final decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union giving its seal of approval to such an apportioning of competences. In any event, it will be interesting to monitor closely the conclusion of the first standalone BITs of the Union -such as the prospective BITs with China 18 and Myanmar 19 -as opposed to free trade agreements (FTAs), which may include policy aspects undisputedly not exclusive.
Even before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, member states did not possess a comprehensive exclusive competence where foreign investment was concerned. The EU had an exclusive competence over the conclusion of treaties that covered the pre-establishment phase (market access), 20 which in practice invited EU involvement in the elaboration of international investment law norms. 21 During this time, the member state competence extended to the post-establishment phase -in other words, to the protection of investment already established in the host country. 22 In line with this division of competences in the pre-Lisbon era, and despite some rare exceptions that apparently did not attract any attention, 23 member states concentrated on the conclusion of treaties covering only postestablishment protections and not containing any provisions concerning market access. 24 At the same time, the EU engaged in the negotiation of FTAs covering market access and the pre-establishment phase, more generally. 25 Thus, while the member states 'focused on the promotion and protection of all forms of investment, the Commission elaborated a liberalisation agenda focused on market access for direct investment '. 26 This 'liberalisation agenda' expressed in the Union's FTAs has, in the last decade, been based on the so-called 'EU Minimum Platform on Investment', an internal document that has purportedly served as a negotiating template for EU FTAs. 27 This model, which is the equivalent of a model BIT for trade negotiations, differs qualitatively from the approach adopted by EU member state BITs, in that it appears to be inspired by different principles and to take into account the parties' right to regulate. 28 A preliminary version of the platform 29 seems to indicate that the final document would contain not only general exceptions modelled after Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 30 but also articles targeting the avoidance of lowered environmental and social standards and laws concerning the protection and promotion of cultural diversity. 31 Following its adoption, the EU Minimum Platform on Investment served as a basis for the negotiation of a number of FTAs, such as the 2008 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 32 and the 2010 EU-South Korea FTA. 33 Indeed, these treaties contain provisions on the non-lowering of environmental, safety, and labour standards, 34 references to the fight against corruption and the International Labour Organization, 35 general exceptions modelled after Article XX of the GATT 36 and security exceptions. 37 The EU-South Korea FTA appears to be the first EU document to explicitly refer to the right to regulate. 38 It is noteworthy that if EU FTAs, covering market access, are deferent to the state's right to regulate, they operate in the field of liberalization and are therefore more intrusive than member states' BITs that only cover investment protection once such investment has been admitted into the host state. Likewise, if the elaboration of new generation international investment treaties allowing host states ampler policy space than their predecessors has taken first shape in North America, 39 both the USA and Canada offer market access through their investment agreements -in other words, these agreements are also more 'invasive' than EU member state BITs. These treaties also generally incorporate country-specific exceptions in the form of negative or positive lists defining clearly the scope of the national and most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to specific sectors or activities. 40 In July 2012, the European Commission considered that the principles that inspired EU FTAs should also inspire the new EU investment policy. In an internal document on investment protection, the right to regulate, sustainable development and human rights, the Commission suggested that future EU investment agreements should safeguard states' right to regulate, in the same manner that EU FTAs do. 41 The EU's desire to extend the right to regulate to its investment treaties is not surprising. Most agreements for which negotiations are currently afoot are prospective FTAs with investment chapters. The EU would be unlikely to digress from its established FTA negotiating canons with the mere pretext that an investment chapter has now been added to the agreement. In theory, it would be possible for the investment chapter to stand 'apart' in the FTA, not forming a harmonious continuum with the rest of the treaty.
The possibility of such 'separateness' of the investment chapter was plainly underlined when, at the end of 2013, after the public announcement that the EU-Singapore FTA had been concluded, it transpired that what in fact had been concluded was an investment chapter-free FTA -in other words, the FTA minus the investment chapter. 42 However, even if an investment chapter stands 'separate' within a comprehensive FTA, the principles that guide the rest of the agreement may indirectly find application 35 in the investment chapter, so much as forming part of the context of the chapter as in view of the principle of systemic integration. 43 It should also be noted that the new treaties, whether comprehensive FTAs or standalone BITs, will probably offer market access along with protection at the post-establishment phase, and, therefore, in light of the reasoning outlined earlier, being more 'intrusive', they are likely to safeguard more policy space for the host state than traditional member state BITs.
Further reasons, more directly linked to the transfer of competence, militate in favour of a policy that takes into account the host economy's right to regulate. Pursuant to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 205 of the TFEU, in the field of the common commercial policy, the EU has a 'constitutional obligation' to comply with the principles that guide its external action. 44 These principles include democracy, human rights, 45 sustainable development, the preservation and improvement of the environment, 46 sustainable management of natural global resources and the guiding principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 47 In this vein, the Council stressed that 'the new European international investment policy should be guided by the principles and objectives of the Union's external action, including the rule of law, human rights and sustainable development' and that it 'must continue to allow the EU and the member states to adopt and enforce measures necessary to pursue public policy objectives'. 48 New generation investment agreements are appropriate in order to guarantee a modicum of regulatory flexibility and ensure that such principles shall be observed without the menace of sizeable compensation awards hanging like the sword of Damocles over public policy-making. 49 Like the Council, the Parliament has also expressed itself as being in favour of taking into account these standards in the EU's future investment policy. Envisioning the future EU investment policy, with its Resolution of 6 April 2011, it emphasized that investor protection 'must remain the first priority' of future EU investment agreements. 50 Yet, with the same breath, it levelled indirect criticism at the European Commission for focusing too strongly on investment protection when it 'should better address the right to protect the public capacity to regulate'. 51 Indeed, the Parliament considered the necessity of achieving a 'balance between investor protection and the 43 The European Parliament's insistence on the principles of Article 21 of the TEU and on the right to regulate is not without significance. If the Commission negotiates the treaties in the new status quo, within the domain of the exclusive EU competence over the common commercial policy, 54 the Parliament has a decisive role that must not be ignored. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 55 the ordinary legislative procedure was introduced in the field of the common commercial policy. 56 As a corollary, according to Article 218(6) of the TFEU, agreements covering foreign direct investment can only be adopted after consent of the Parliament has been obtained. 57 The latter will also need to be regularly informed of the progress of the negotiations. 58 In other words, the Parliament has a veto power over the conclusion of EU investment agreements, and it seems to be conscious of its new role.
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Beyond these developments within the EU, it is important to recognize that the elaboration of the Union's investment policy is not cut off from other developments in international economic law. It is worth observing, for instance, that South Africa has terminated its BITs with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and (also Switzerland). 60 It appears that the country has also given notice of termination of its BIT with France, and it is reportedly preparing to terminate other first-generation BITs concluded with EU member states. Indonesia has given notice of termination of its BIT with the Netherlands 61 and is said to be considering renegotiation of its investment treaties. 62 It is remarkable that Indonesia has never ratified its renegotiated BIT with Denmark. However, beyond the denunciations of BITs, which may encourage a rethinking of the drafting of new international investment agreements (IIAs), the EU is negotiating its first IIAs with, among others, the USA 64 and Canada, 65 states that have pioneered the drafting of new generation investment agreements. Marking its distances from the investment treaty standards of its member states, the EU is turning to, and taking to a new level, the drafting of these new generation treaties. The analysis that ensues will focus on the shift from member state 'best practices' to this novel standard of the EU.
The 'Best Practices' of EU Member States
Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the conclusion of treaties covering foreign direct investment belonged to the exclusive competence of the member states. As a consequence, the latter concluded around 1,400 BITs, 66 a number that, as mentioned, amounts to half of the world's BITs. 67 In contrast with EU FTAs, which are generally cognizant of the state's right to regulate, EU member state BITs contain some of the last vestiges of international economic law's laissez-faire liberalism. 68 This statement creates the impression that the proposed member states' best practices relate to the highest level of protection for investors, a task partly incompatible with the conclusion of the balanced treaties that jar with unlimited investor protection. 89 In comparable fashion, the European Parliament has stressed that future EU investment agreements should be based on the best practices of the member states. 90 Analogous phrases were employed in the negotiating directives for the treaties to be concluded with Canada, India, Singapore and the USA. 91 For instance, according to the EU-US High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which was negotiated between the EU and the USA, 'should include investment liberalization and protection provisions based on the highest levels of liberalization and highest standards of protection that both sides have negotiated to date', 92 a statement later rehearsed in the negotiating directive for the same agreement. 93 The terms 'high' or 'the highest' levels of investment protection, with which EU member state best practices have ostensibly become synonymous, is a fast conclusion 83 that may not reflect a more complex reality on the ground. As an illustration, the European Commission specified that the enounced levels of protection in the TTIP correspond to 'the highest levels of liberalisation and investment protection that both sides have negotiated to date in other trade deals'. 94 This is not astonishing, given that until the Treaty of Lisbon the EU did not have the competence to conclude agreements covering investment protection at the post-establishment stage but was limited to market access provisions. As noted earlier, EU free trade agreements have been more favourable to the state's right to regulate and public interest objectives than their member state investment treaty counterparts. In the same vein, if the 2012 Statement of the European Union and the United States on Shared Principles for International Investment reaffirmed the parties' attachment to principles relating to international investments such as a 'strong protection for investors' and 'effective dispute settlement procedures', 95 this was not to be achieved by refusing the state's right to regulate. According to the statement, 'governments can fully implement these principles while still preserving the authority to adopt and maintain measures necessary to regulate in the public interest to pursue certain public policies'. 96 The statement also stressed that 'governments should not seek to attract foreign investment by weakening or failing to apply such measures'. 97 On occasion, EU institutions have stressed that the proposed provisions, such as security exceptions, are compatible with EU member state best practices. 98 In all probability, the mention of best practices in EU documents is no more than a means of member state 'appeasement'.
If official EU documents expressly cite EU member state best practices, the new policy that is being sketched bears little in common with the traditional BITs of the member states. As noted, the European Commission, already in 2010, while citing member state 'best practices' that ought to 'inspire' 'the principles and parameters' for EU negotiations, emphasized that it is the Commission itself that determines the 'scope and standards' of future EU investment agreements. 99 In other words, the role of member state best practices is relegated to (merely) offering 'inspiration' for new agreements. The TTIP's public consultation document clearly specified that the Union wishes to 'rely on past treaty practice with a proven track record'. In a recent document of the European Parliament on the negotiations between the EU and China, the discrepancy between EU objectives and member state practices is likewise obvious. The Parliament remarks that the EU-China treaty 'should be based on the best practices drawn from Member State experiences' and then goes on to explain the standards that these treaties must contain. 101 The elaboration of some of these is quite dissimilar to the acquis of member state best practices. Probably, the most obvious example is the formulation of the fair and equitable treatment standard, whose content is made explicit for the first time. 102 Furthermore, while in 2010, the European Commission cited the best practices 'that member states have developed ', 103 in the Parliament resolutions of 6 April 2011 and 9 October 2013 the tone changes. 104 The new phrase is somewhat ambivalent, in that, stricto sensu, there is no longer a question of EU member state best practices but, rather, of best practices drawn (by the EU) from the latters' experience. The elusive legal meaning attached to the new phrasing is underlined by the possibility that the new treaties shall adopt only the best practices drawn from the experiences of the member states.
As a closing remark, it may be added that, exceptionally, some EU documents rehearse 'no-higher-than-domestic-standards' statements, and so they further digress from EU member state 'best practices'. In April 2014, the Parliament noted that 'Union agreements should afford foreign investors the same high level of protection as Union law and the general principles common to the laws of the member states grant to investors from within the Union, but not a higher level of protection'. 105 Although it is difficult to appreciate the significance of such statements at this stage, all elements seem to indicate that EU member state model provisions only have an accessory role to play in EU investment negotiations.
3 The 'Invisibility' of the EU Model BIT However, before querying this new standard of the EU, it is important to address the question of whether there is one single standard and to consider why, if there is a single standard, it remains at this stage 'invisible'. 106 Transaction costs involved in investment treaty negotiation, as when treaties in arbitration are invoked, plead in favour of the development of model BITs, 107 and so the use of these treaty templates is widespread among industrialized economies, in particular. But despite an early suggestion in 2006 that '[a] new, ambitious model EU investment agreement should be developed in close coordination with Member States', 108 the EU's nascent investment policy is being designed in the absence of a model agreement comparable to the model BITs of the member states.
In 2010, the European Commission took a position against the adoption of an EU model investment agreement. It explained that adopting a 'one-size-fits-all model' would be 'neither feasible nor desirable' and that the Union would need to take into account the particularities of each negotiation, including the interests of its stakeholders and the level of development of its partners. 109 The divergence between concluded member state BITs was noted by both the Commission and the Parliament, 110 and the latter, in particular, called on the Commission 'to reconcile these divergences to provide a strong EU template for investment agreements'. 111 However, the Parliament specified that this template or model 112 'would also be adjustable according to the level of development of the partner country'. 113 This 'divergence' among concluded member state BITs is an element that must not be ignored, as it constitutes itself an argument against the hasty adoption of an EU model investment treaty. Suffice it to recall the lengthy and painstaking efforts to reach agreement at the EU member state level before the adoption of the first negotiating directives in September 2011, 114 in order to appreciate the difficulties involved in any attempt to find a common concrete solution to the drafting of a model BIT.
Insisting on the need to draft an EU model investment agreement in this early phase of the exercise of the EU's competence may also seem precipitated for another reason. The elaboration and adoption of model investment agreements generally succeeds the conclusion of the first BITs. A few examples amply illustrate this point. If Germany adopted its first model BIT about one year after the conclusion of its BIT with Pakistan, 115 the Netherlands did so more than a decade after its first BIT 116 and Austria more than 20 years later. 117 France had not made public a model BIT until 2006, Korea not until 2001 119 and Colombia adopted a model BIT around 10 years after the conclusion of its treaties with Mexico and Venezuela in 1994. 120 Changes to model BITs have often been incorporated in concluded agreements before an official revision of the model. For instance, this is the case of the US policy shift regarding the drafting of the essential security interests exception as self-judging, already in the 1999 US-Bahrain BIT.
121 It is also noteworthy that provisions repeatedly found in a country's investment treaties may be considered to constitute a de facto model. 122 Finally, the non-adoption of a model BIT, although rare in practice, is not unique to the EU. Australia has never adopted a negotiating model investment agreement, although it must also be noted that the country does not play a primordial role in BIT negotiations. 123 The same reason may explain why another state, Japan, has likewise not adopted a model BIT. 124 Yet, it is notable that Switzerland, a prolific treaty negotiator, has never had a model BIT.
125
Irrespective of these considerations, it appears that the decision of the EU not to proceed with the adoption of a model BIT so far results, among others, from its intention to accord more ample policy space to developing countries as compared to developed economies. 126 This would imply that investment treaties concluded between the EU and developed economies would be more liberal and would afford narrower regulatory flexibility to host states. However, the veracity of this statement is not selfevident. 127 As will be discussed later in this article, the CETA with Canada and the TTIP negotiations with the USA aim to allow the state its regulatory flexibility, and they do so in a definitely novel fashion for Europe. It is also remarkable that the quest for ampler policy space was launched by these same negotiating partners of the EU in the mid-2000s, 128 and it was expressed and reiterated in later treaties and (versions) of their model BITs.
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Having followed a consistent approach with respect to regulatory flexibility in the last decade, it would be surprising if these two states abandoned their 'new' models when negotiating with the EU. It is also questionable from the point of view of the Union whether it is advisable to offer greater regulatory flexibility to developing economies, where it intends to protect its investors, and narrower flexibility to developed economies, whose investors are likely to become actively involved in disputes against the EU and its member states. At the same time, it is possible that the first concluded investment treaties of the Union will set an involuntary standard that may be emulated -but also amended -in subsequent negotiations.
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The New Standard of the EU
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the exercise of the new competence and the final shape of EU investment agreements, the EU is formulating an investment policy that goes beyond the new generation of investment agreements, and it is the novelty of this approach that underlines the advent of a new standard. Given the EU's weight in investment negotiations, there is a real opportunity for it 'to set a new agenda for investment protection and investor state [sic] dispute settlement provisions'. 131 The Union wishes to improve its investment agreements in a twofold approach that targets substantive and procedural standards. The analysis that follows will explore the two in turn.
A Substantive Standards
With its new investment policy, the EU wishes to achieve a 'better balance' between the state's right to regulate and investment protection and to elaborate 'clearer and better standards'. 132 The two objectives are entwined, and the Commission considers that investment protections must be clearly defined and leave no room for 'interpretative ambiguity', particularly where the 'state's right to regulate for public policy ob jectives' is involved. 133 The Commission emphasizes, in particular, the right of the states to pursue legitimate public policy objectives and explains that this 'principle' of EU FTAs will apply to the investment protection provisions of the EU agreements.
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According to the directives that authorized the investment negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore, each agreement should be 'without prejudice to the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce … measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as social, environmental, security, public health and safety in a non-discriminatory manner. The agreement shall respect the policies of the EU and its Member States for the promotion and protection of cultural diversity'.
135 Similar statements were made in the TTIP negotiating directive. 136 Accordingly, the consolidated text of the CETA incorporates Article XX of the GATT 137 and includes, inter alia, carve-outs for the audio-visual sector, 138 exceptions for national security, 139 prudential 140 and safeguard measures and balance of payment problems. 141 In attempting, among others, to safeguard a 'balance' between investment protections and the host economy's right to regulate, the Commission stresses the need to draft treaty standards in a 'detailed and precise manner'. 142 Apart from innovative preamble language, 143 which is unusual not only in EU member state BITs but also in the Canadian Model BIT, 144 the new EU approach targets investment law's two most important standards, fair and equitable treatment and expropriation. As far as indirect expropriation is concerned, the EU introduces provisions similar to those found in Annex B of the US and Canadian BITs. 145 Like these models, the CETA explicitly rejects the sole effect doctrine 146 and enjoins the tribunal to consider the 'reasonable' ex pectations of investors. 147 However, unlike its predecessors, it introduces a requirement to take into account the 'character' of the measure and, notably, its 'object, context and intent', and, significantly, it incorporates an element of proportionality. According to the CETA's annex on expropriation: except in the rare circumstance where the impact of the measure or series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations. 148 Such a provision is absent from the BITs concluded by EU member states, 149 and, if it exists in the US and Canadian Model BITs, the CETA's formulation is new. According to the European Commission, this new provision aims, inter alia, to ensure that investors shall not be compensated 'just because their profits have been reduced through the effects of regulations enacted for a public policy objective'. 150 This statement makes reference to the crucial dilemma of how to draw the line between an indirect expropriation and a non-compensable regulation taken in the public interest. 151 As it will be recalled, the presence of a public interest is, in any case, required for the lawfulness of even an indirect expropriation. 152 At the same time, this statement reiterates the rejection of the sole effect doctrine and aligns the EU position with the police powers doctrine. 153 The second standard that the EU wishes to specify in its investment agreements is fair and equitable treatment. This approach has already been adopted in the treaty with Singapore and with Canada. 154 The latter two agreements contain a novel provision that enumerates in quasi-exhaustive manner 155 the measures that are incompatible with fair and equitable treatment. Accordingly, the fair and equitable treatment clause is violated, inter alia, where a measure or a series of measures constitutes denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, a fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of transparency in judicial and administrative proceedings, manifest arbitrariness, targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds or abusive treatment of investors, including coercion, duress and harassment. 156 It is noteworthy that in the current version of the CETA, one of the most essential notions of fair and equitable treatment, namely the protection of the investor's legitimate expectations, does not figure among the list of its constituents. On the contrary, the frustration of the investor's legitimate expectations stands alone in a separate paragraph as an element that a tribunal 'may' take into account 'when applying the above fair and equitable treatment'. 157 Legitimate expectations may be born where a party has made 'a specific representation to an investor to induce a covered investment'. 158 The European Commission explains that the purpose of this provision is to ensure that the fair and equitable treatment standard does not amount to a 'stabilisation obligation'. 159 It is hoped that this formulation will be refined in future EU investment agreements. A final aspect of the fair and equitable guarantee of this article must be noted -one that is in conformity with the practice of the member states -namely, the new EU treaties abandon the traditional approach of new generation North American investment agreements, which tether fair and equitable treatment to the minimum standard of treatment and, therefore, establish the former as a standard independent of the latter. 160 Apart from the new formulations of these standards, the recently negotiated treaties explain that the full protection and security standard relates only to 'physical security'. 161 The CETA further reveals a specification to the effect that the mostfavoured-nation treatment 'does not include investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures provided for in other international investment treaties and other trade agreements'. Substantive obligations in such other agreements do not constitute 'treatment', and, therefore, they 'cannot give rise to a breach of this article, absent measures adopted by a Party'. 162 Although a provision concerning the exclusion of the application of the most-favoured-nation treatment from a treaty's investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions has started to be included in new generation agreements, 163 it does not figure in the US, Canadian or EU member state model BITs nor, in fact, in any 'influential' model BITs.
B ISDS
The elaboration of the new EU investment policy is not limited to a reformulation of substantive standards of investment protection. At this stage of the investment negotiation process, many issues remain unclear with respect to ISDS (topics such as the interpretive autonomy of the EU and the question of which dispute settlement mechanisms will be included in future EU agreements). Although it is beyond the purpose of the present analysis to explore these issues and difficulties, attention will be drawn to some discordant voices in the approval of ISDS, redolent of, or sympathetic to, the previous Australian government's views in this respect, 164 before focusing on aspects of procedural standards that the EU wishes to include in its new investment agreements.
New Scepticism vis-à-vis Investor-State Dispute Settlement?
New EU agreements, including, notably, those negotiated with industrialized economies, are expected to embrace ISDS provisions. This expectation, however, should not lead one to consider the inclusion of ISDS a foregone conclusion, given that critiques of it may have affected attitudes vis-à-vis the dispute settlement mechanism. The EU institutions involved in the formulation of the EU's investment policy have clearly indicated that EU investment agreements must provide an effective ISDS system. 165 The Commission has expressed the view that the absence of provision for investment arbitration -the latter being 'such an established feature of investment agreements' -would discourage investors and lower the attractiveness of an economy as an investment destination. 166 The need for ISDS was likewise discussed by the Council 167 and the European Parliament. 168 However, the Parliament has also emphasized that including ISDS in the EU-negotiated agreements 'is not a necessity' but, rather, should be perceived as 'a conscious and informed policy choice that requires political and economic justification' and that 'the question whether to include ISDS should be decided for each International Investment Agreement in the light of the particular circumstances'. 169 This line echoes the view that EU investment agreements should not be based on the earlier-mentioned 'one-sizefits-all model'. In a different document, the European Parliament's view that EU investment agreements must provide protection that is no greater than that afforded by EU law equally raises questions. 170 In the intra-EU BIT debate, ISDS has been discussed as an element introducing discrimination between EU investors. 171 Paradoxically, this statement is included in the Parliament's position relating to the adoption of the regulation appeals mechanism in order to increase consistency in ISDS. 195 While some treaties, such as the US Model BIT, envisage the possibility of a future appellate system, the Commission expects the TTIP to create such a mechanism.
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Conclusion
International investment law is an evolving vibrant field, and nowhere is this more evident than in the exercise of the EU's new competence over foreign direct investment. Despite adding a layer of complexity to investment negotiations, the new state of affairs creates the opportunity for the EU not only to influence the drafting of investment treaty standards but also to improve international investment law in unprecedented ways. Breaking free from the old-fashioned 'European' approach of the member states, the Union has designed its own investment negotiating 'model', establishing a new standard. This standard is in harmony with the new generation of investment agreements, first born in North America. The elaboration of an actual EU model agreement -whether adopted in black-and-white form or emerging as a de facto template -is still to come. However, it is probable that we stand at the threshold of an even newer generation of international investment treaties and one that is set to change the face of international investment law as we know it.
